Cameco Corporation v. R. – TCC: Detailed decision outlines terms required in full disclosure under Rule 82

Bill Innes on Current Tax Cases

http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/tcc-cci/decisions/en/item/66842/index.do New Window

Cameco Corporation v. The Queen[1] (February 13, 2014) is a long (63 paragraphs) and highly detailed decision on a series of motions by the Crown on matters of interlocutory procedure.  In summary some of the motions were quashed because the appeals were rendered nullities by new reassessments, one motion was withdrawn and the court rendered a decision on one motion for a 2003 appeal dealing with the extent of disclosure required of the appellant.

The disclosure in question was “full disclosure” by consent under Rule 82 of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure).  The Crown’s objections were essentially fourfold:

1.     1.  The disclosure was alleged to be incomplete.

2.      2.  The disclosure contained redactions.

3.      3.  The disclosure claimed solicitor-client privilege without a sufficient identification of the documents to ground a claim for privilege.

4.      4.  The description of the documents was inadequate.

The court agreed with the Crown that the disclosure to date had been incomplete:

[43]        Electronic discovery poses many challenges and a more practical and efficient process is necessary to ensure that the burden of discovery remains proportionate to the issues, interest and money at stake. The Sedona Canada Principles have become the de facto standard for many rules of civil procedure. With respect to electronic discovery, The Sedona Canada Principles Addressing Electronic Discovery in Principle 2 provides:

In any proceeding, the parties should ensure that steps taken in the discovery process are proportionate, taking into account (i) the nature and scope of the litigation, including the importance and complexity of the issues, interest and amounts at stake; (ii) the relevance of the available electronically stored information; (iii) its importance to the court’s adjudication in a given case; and (iv) the costs, burden and delay that may be imposed on the parties to deal with electronically stored information.

[44]        The facts in this appeal are complex. The Affidavit of Peter Macdonald describes the document collection process and it is apparent that the appellant has dedicated significant resources including employing expertise, time and costs. Yet, given the complexity of this case and the amount at stake, it is not unreasonable for the appellant to review and conduct additional searches and make further inquiries into certain documents.

[45]        There are deficiencies in the appellant’s production of documents and, having agreed to conduct full disclosure, the appellant must provide all documents that are relevant and material to any matter in issue. The appellant’s law firm did review material in its possession but, as Mr. Macdonald stated, counsel did not require the appellant to make a further review of material in its possession, for example.

[46]        I am informed by respondent’s counsel that on January 21, 2014 the Crown received a DVD from the appellant containing 2,389 documents. At a case management conference on January 30 of this year, appellant’s counsel advised that these may be all the outstanding documents being sought by the respondent. I did inform counsel of both parties that I would be ordering a better List of Documents with respect to the 2003 appeal and that the appellant would be required to make additional searches. Since the respondent has had possession of the latest DVD for close to a month her application to delay discovery of the appellant will be extended to 120 days from service of any additional List of Documents. Counsel replied that the appellant would require 30 days to make the searches.

[Footnote omitted]

In addition, the court agreed with the Crown that there had been inadequate disclosure of the grounds for claiming solicitor-client privilege:

[54]        A task before me is to determine whether internal communication contained legal advice or whether it was non-privileged internal communication. Solicitor‑client privilege may exist if it involved communication with counsel. However, where no information is provided about who prepared the documents one cannot even adduce the grounds for privilege. It may very well be that the documents in question are protected due to solicitor-client privilege but it is up to the appellant to provide some basis for their claim. For that reason, I will have to allow the respondent’s motion that the appellant provide a further and better affidavit of documents that properly discloses any claim for privilege.

Similarly, on the issue of redactions:

[56]        With respect to improperly claiming privilege over documents in its Schedule A and Schedule B documents, the appellant did not properly provide a basis for the documents where privilege is claimed. The appellant shall review redactions to ensure privilege has been properly claimed and provide a basis for documents where privilege has been claimed. Redactions for privacy, such as the salary are appropriate so long as it does not render the relevant parts incomprehensible.

Finally, the court endorsed the use of a single numeric identifier of the documents rather than listing  author and date:

[62]           In oral submissions before me, the respondent’s counsel commented that it would actually be more helpful to only have the document identifier number and no author and no date. I agree. So long as the appellant has provided sufficient description of the documents using a numerical identifier for each document, its identification of the document is satisfactory.

Comment:  While this decision will likely only be relevant to a handful of very large tax cases it is clearly a harbinger of the future as the Tax Court comes to grips with the age of electronic discovery.

[1] 2014 TCC 45.